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Moses as Go-Between: 
John Spencer's Theory of Religious Translation 
Introduction 
To present Moses as a go-between in the context of a volume on Renaissance 
go-betweens may seem an unlikely proposition - after all, the Moses of the 
Bible, if he ever lived at all, cannot have been alive during the Renaissance. 
My only excuse is that I am dealing with Moses as he was conceived of by Dr. 
John Spencer, who lived from 1630 until 1693. In his monumental work De 
Legibus Hebraeorum Ritualibus, Spencer presented Moses as a figure between 
two worlds, the Hebrew world in which he was born and to which he eventu­
ally returned, and the Egyptian world in which he was educated.1 This sounds 
very much like the Biblical Moses; Spencer's Moses, however, did not simply 
return to his people, but brought and taught them what he had learned in the 
Egyptian mysteries. His legislation amounts to a translation of Egyptian 
'hieroglyphical' wisdom into Hebrew Law. This is what made him a genuine 
go­between. 
Spencer's Egyptian genealogy of Biblical religion calls to mind the writ­
ings of Freud, who also held that Moses took his monotheism from Egypt. 
And in fact, John Spencer was himself a go­between. He stood between the 
world of the theological tradition of the 17LH century, and the world of free­
thought, i.e. deism and freemasonry, of the 18th century, and in an even wider 
perspective, he stands, as we shall see, between Maimonidcs, the Jewish phi­
losopher of the 12th century, and Sigmund Freud, the Jewish theorist of the 
20lh century. 
In his own time, Spencer held an uncontested position as a dean of Ely and 
prefector of Corpus Christi College in Cambridge, and was never, to the best 
I John Spencer, De legibus Hebraeorum ritualibus ei earumque ralionibus libri ires (Cambridge 
1685). I am using the second edition (The Hague, 1686) and the enlarged third edition, which 
appeared 1732 at Tubingen, containing a biography of Spencer and a survey of critical objec­
tions to Spencer's theory. 
Originalveröffentlichung in: Andreas Höfele, Werner v. Koppenfels (Hg.), Renaissance Go-Betweens. 
Cultural Exchange in Early Modern Europe, Berlin-New York 2005, S. 163-174
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of my knowledge, suspected of heterodoxy. In the 18th century, however, he 
was reclaimed by deists, freemasons and other representatives of freethought 
as a pioneering and groundbreaking predecessor, one who, in deriving the 
Mosaic Legislation from the Egyptian mysteries, replaced the idea of revela­
tion with the concept of translation. My own first encounter with Spencer's 
work was strongly determined by this perspective. I met with his name in a 
masonic treatise by the philosopher Carl Leonhard Reinhold, published in 
1787, a book which turned out to be the model for Schiller's fascinating essay 
The Legation of Moses, which in fact anticipates Freud's thesis that what 
Moses taught the Hebrews was an Egyptian religion.2 To put it briefly, Rein­
hold argues that the Egyptian goddess Isis and the Biblical Jehova (this is how 
he spells the Tetragrammaton) is one and the same deity, and that Biblical 
monotheism is a straight copy ­ a bad and reductive copy at that ­ of the 
Egyptian mysteries. The name 'Jehova' means, according to Reinhold, 'He 
who is' or 'Essential Being', and God reveals himself as such to Moses saying 
'I am who I am'; this is a copy of Isis' revelation ­ in the famous inscription 
on the 'veiled image' as rendered by Plutarch and Proclus ­ that she is 'All 
that is, was, and will be', or in other words, 'Essential Being'. Thus Moses 
took everything from Egypt, whose wisdom he had learned when he was edu­
cated as a prince at the Pharaonic court, and turned it into the monotheistic 
religion of the Hebrews, reducing the sublime deity of the mysteries, the All­
and­One, to the national god of the Jews. Rather than revelation, then, we are 
dealing with translation. For this revolutionary or at least heretical thesis, 
Reinhold quotes two authorities: Rabbi Ben Maimon and Dr. Spencer. Given 
the fact that Reinhold based his conclusions on Spencer and Maimonides, and 
may, via Schiller, in turn have influenced Freud, we can discern a line of tradi­
tion leading from the 12lh century up to the 20lh century, with Spencer as a 
hinge between medieval Jewish philosophy and modern psycho­history. 
Spencer held that Moses learned everything in the Egyptian mysteries and 
that the Ritual laws which Moses instituted were just borrowed from Egyptian 
ritual and its 'hieroglyphs'. However, Spencer never goes so far as to postulate 
that Moses took his monotheistic concept of God from the Egyptians; in fact, 
he does not deal with Egyptian theology at all. It is not the content of mystery 
religion which interests Spencer. According to him, it was the structure of the 
Egyptian religion that Moses copied, a structure which Spencer reconstructed 
as double­faced, divided into the inner and the outer, esotericism and exoteri­
cism. Spencer was convinced that it was God's specific plan for Moses to 
learn this structure of a double religion (religio duplex) from the Egyptian 
mysteries; only after being 'nourished with the hieroglyphic literature of 
2 Carl Leonhard Reinhold, Die Hebrdischen Mysterien oder die ullesle religiose Freymaurerey. 
ed. wilh a commentary by Jan Assmann (Ncckargemilnd: lidilion Mnemosyne, 2001). 
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Egypt' (hieroglyphicis Aegypti Uteris innutritum) was Moses in a position to 
be chosen as God's first prophet. 'God wished', Spencer says, 'that Moses 
should write the mystic images of the more sublime things. The hieroglyphic 
literature, in which Moses was educated, was fairly convenient for this pur­
pose.'3 What else could have been the reason for the long sojourn of the chil­
dren of Israel in Egypt? What else the reason for the complicated strategy of 
smuggling a Hebrew child into the Pharaonic family and having him educated 
in all the wisdom of the Egyptians (Acts 7:22), that is, initiated into the Egyp­
tian mysteries? Evidently, God wanted to give the Jews a religion that was as 
double­faced as that of the Egyptians: to quote Spencer again, 'carnal only in 
frontispiece, but divine and wonderful in its interior in order to accomodate his 
institutions to the taste and usage of the time lest his Law and cult should seem 
deficient in anything transmitted in the name of wisdom.'4 
For Spencer, it is this concept of a mystery religion that provides the 
strongest parallels between Egypt and Israel ­ the religion of the Old Testa­
ment, he states, is a mystery religion too. He substantiates this thesis with two 
distinct and distant quotations from Clement of Alexandria, which he com­
bines into a coherent whole: 
The Egyptians indicated the really sacred logos which they kept in the innermost 
sanctuary of Truth by what they called Adyta, and the Hebrews (indicated it) by 
means of the curtain (in the temple). Therefore, as far as concealment is con­
cerned, the secrets (ainigmata) of both the Hebrews and the Egyptians are very 
similar to each other.5 
These were the points which Reinhold adopted from Spencer's work: first, that 
the Jewish religion was a mystery religion or, in his words, 'the oldest freema­
sonry', and secondly, that, in this respect, it was a straight copy of Egyptian 
religion. Under the surface of the Jewish laws, just as under the surface of the 
Egyptian hieroglyphs, there is an esoteric doctrine of truth. Another of 
Spencer's quotations, which he adduces in order to prove the esoteric charac­
ter of Biblical religion, is taken from Eusebius: 
Moses ordered the Jewish plebs to be committed to all of the rites which were in­
cluded in the words of their laws. But he wished that the others, whose mind and 
3 See Spencer, 157: Deum voluisse ut Moses mystica rerum suhlimiorum simulacra scriberel, eo 
quod huiusmodi scribendi ratio, literaturae, qua Moses inslitulus erat, hieroglyphicae non 
parum conveniret. 
4 Spencer, De legibus, 157: aequum est opinari, Deum religionem, carnalem quidem in fron-
tispicio, sed divinam et mirandam in penetrali. Judaeis tradidisse. ul instituta sua ad seculi 
gustum et usum accomodaret. 
5 Spencer combines two distant passages from Clement's stromata book V: cap. Ill, 19.3 and 
cap. VI, 41.2, see Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata Buch 1-V1, ed. Otto Stahlin, 4th ed. (Berlin: 
Akademie­Verlag, 1985), 338 and 354; Reinhold, Hebraische Myslerien. 83, quotes the same 
sentences, obviously after Spencer, De legibus. 
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virtue were stronger as they were liberated from this exterior shell, should accus­
tom themselves to a philosophy more divine and superior to common man, and 
should penetrate with the eye of the mind into the higher meaning of the laws.6 
Reinhold not only quotes this passage, he makes it a motto to one of his chap­
ters, giving the text neither in Eusebius' Greek nor in his own translation, but 
in Spencer's Latin paraphrase. This detail shows again how much he relies on 
Spencer. Reading Spencer with Reinhold's eyes, it was hardly avoidable to 
read Reinhold's conclusions into Spencer's text. It was all already there, and 
any crown of revolutionary innovation would have to be accorded to Spencer, 
not to Reinhold, who was just an epigone. The only difference between 
Spencer and Reinhold was that Spencer restricted the equation of Egyptian 
and Biblical religion to ritual structure whereas Reinhold extended it to cover 
theological content too. 
There is certainly a Reinhold side in Spencer's text that makes it seem a 
revolutionary breakthrough in the history of enlightenment, pointing forward 
to Sigmund Freud and the 20th century, but there is an equally strong Maimon­
ides side pointing backward to the Middle Ages. It is this doublefacedness of 
Spencer's book that makes it a go­between. 
Normative Inversion 
Having briefly dealt with Spencer's Reinhold side, let us now turn, equally 
briefly, to Spencer's Maimonides side. It is from Maimonidcs that Spencer 
takes his project of 'explaining' the ritual laws of the Hebrews ­ et earum 
rationibus. In his Moreh Nevuchim, Maimonides embarks on the project of 
what in Rabbinical tradition is called ta 'amej ha-mizvot, explaining the laws, 
and even extending this project beyond moral and juridical law, mizvot and 
mishpatim, to ritual law or hukkim. which, in the Jewish tradition, was held to 
6 Judaeorum plebem quidem. rilibus omnibus quomodo Legum ipsarum verbis concepli eranl. 
Moses obstrictam. teneri iussil. Caeleros autem, quorum mens esse! virlusque firmior, cum eo 
cortice liberalos esse, turn ad diviniorem aliquam et homini vulgo superiorem Philosophiam 
assuescere. & in alliorem Legum earum sensum mentis oculo penetrare. voluit. (Praep. Evang-
I. 7 cap. 10, p.m. 378. Spencer, 156.) I had a hard time verifying this passage in a modern edi­
tion of the Praeparatio Evangelica; what 1 eventually came up with reads as follows: 'Now, 
after having perused the commandments of the sacred laws, the allegorical mode of symbolism 
it employs, there is even more to be signalized. Dividing the Jewish people into two classes, 
the Logos subjected the masses to the explicit commandments in their literal sense (kata ten 
rheten dtanoian), but liberated the other class, the experts, from this literal application, in or­
der to attach themselves to a more divine philosophy, superior to the many and to (pay atten­
tion) with a theoretical mind (theona) to the higher meaning of the laws.' (Praeparatio Evan-
gelica VIII 10, 18; Karl Mras (cd ), Die Werke Eusebius 8. Die Praeparatio Evangelica fi 
(Berlin: Akademie­Vcrlag, 1982], 454). 
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be inexplainable, without reason, so that it was, in fact, forbidden to seek for 
its reasons. This traditional Jewish view was impossible for a rationalist phi­
losopher like Maimonides to accept. God was not to be conceived of as a ty­
rannical, arbitrary legislator, but must have had his reasons to give his people 
all these seemingly inexplicable laws. If there are no rational reasons to be 
found, the laws must be explained historically. In his search for historical 
circumstances, Maimonides became a ­ perhaps even the first ­ historian of 
religion, discovering the 'Zabians' as exponents of 'paganism', a forgotten 
world­religion which once formed the historical and religious environment of 
the Jewish people. His idea was that God was condescendent enough to take 
this historical context into consideration when giving His people the Law, so 
that He adapted His laws to the customs and the cognitive capacity of the Jews 
of that time, who were totally assimilated to pagan religion, that is, to innu­
merable rituals, sacrifices and ceremonies. This was why the religion he gave 
them contained as many rituals, sacrifices and ceremonial prescriptions as 
pagan idolatry, but in a form that would slowly turn their mind in the direction 
of true worship, knowledge and justice. In order to understand the ceremonial 
laws (khukkim1), therefore, it is necessary to study paganism. Thus, Maimon­
ides became the founder of the discipline which flourished in the seventeenth 
century and to which Spencer's work made a particularly important contribu­
tion: the study of paganism, or 'paganology'. 
Maimonides anticipated Spencer's approach in postulating a relationship 
between pagan and biblical religion and in defining this relationship as one of 
model and copy: for Maimonides, pagan or 'Zabian' religion was the model 
for the ritual laws of the Bible. The only difference is that Maimonides defined 
this relationship as inversion, whereas Spencer defined it as translation. For 
Maimonides, the ritual laws of the Bible inverted the sacrificial rites of the 
Zabians. If the Zabians prohibited the slaughtering of rams and bulls, because 
the ram was the sacred animal of Amun and the bull the sacred animal of 
Osiris, the Apis bull, the law prescribed the sacrificial slaughtering of pre­
cisely these animals. If the Zabians practised the rite of boiling the kid in the 
milk of its mother and sprinkling trees and bushes with the milk in order to 
ensure fertility, the law prohibited the cooking of meat and milk together. 
Since there was little known about the Zabians and their sacrificial rites, Mai­
monides was free to reconstruct (or invent) them just by inverting the Biblical 
laws, turning Biblical prohibitions into Zabian prescriptions and vice­versa.8 
The Law is divided inlo milsvol, mishpatim, and khukkim or. in Thomas Aquinas' translation, 
moralia.judicialia and caeremonialia. 
He took his knowledge about the Zabians/Sabcans/Sabaeans from a book by (he tenth­century 
author Ibn Wahshiyya on Nabatacan agriculture (arab. al-fildha al-nabaliyya, hebr. ha-avoda 
ha-nabatit), whose title was often referred to in Latin translations as De agricultura (or ser-
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Stephen Nettles, in his answer to John Seldon, Oxford 1625, characterizes this 
principle as follows: 'Moses Ben Maimon in More Hanebucim writes that the 
end for which sacrifices were commanded did tend especially to the rooting 
out of idolatry: for whereas the Gentiles worshipped beasts, as the Chaldacans 
and Aegyptians bullocks and sheep, with reference to the Celestiall Signes, 
Aries and Taurus, etc., therefore (saith he) God commanded these to be slaine 
in sacrifice'.9 Instead of Maimonides, however, Nettles could equally well 
have referred to Tacitus, who stated as early as the Is' century CE that 'the 
Jews consider everything that we keep sacred as profane and permit every­
thing that for us is taboo (profana illic omnia quae apud nos sacra, rursum 
concessa apud illos quae nobis incesta). In their temples they consecrate a 
statue of a donkey and sacrifice a ram in contumeliam Ammonis 'in order to 
ridicule the god Amun.' For the same reason, 'they sacrifice a bull because the 
Egyptians worship Apis.'10 This is the principle of normative inversion, of 
which Tacitus not only gives the most concise definition but which he also 
presents with unmistakably anti­Jewish intentions. Normative inversion 
seems, in fact, to be a cliche of antique anti­Semitism, occurring in many 
descriptions of the Jews, and it is surprising to meet with this same principle in 
an authoritative Jewish author such as Maimonides. He sees in normative 
inversion a kind of withdrawal therapy and a mnemotcchnique of forgetting. 
There is no intentional forgetting; the only way to get rid of a memory is by 
superinscription. The only way to make the children of Israel forget the idola­
trous rites which they adopted in Egypt was to superinscribe them by similar 
laws in the opposite direction. The technique worked so well that the religion 
of the Zabians was altogether forgotten in the time when Maimonides tried to 
reconstruct it. 
Translation 
500 years later, when Spencer took up Maimonides' project, he quite naturally 
equated Maimonides' Zabians with the ancient Egyptians. Unlike Maimon­
ides, however, he did not simply reconstruct or invent the Egyptian rites as the 
opposite of the ritual laws of the Hebrews but collected a huge documentation 
on Egyptian rituals drawn mostly from Greek but also from Latin and Rab­
binic sources. The richness of his sources is surprising; modern Egyptology 
has no idea of how much information about ancient Egyptian religion could be 
vitio: the Hebrew term avodah can have both meanings) Aegypliorum (ralher than Na-
bathaeorum). See Stroumsa, loc.cit., 16-17. 
9 Stephen Nettles, Answer to the Jewish Part of Mr Selden s History of Tithes (Oxford, 1625). 
46-47, quoted after Stroumsa, loc.cit., 17. 
10 Historiae, V, § 5.4 = Stem, Creek and Latin Authors II, 19 and 2. 
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gained simply from Greek and other sources, without any knowledge of the 
Egyptian script. Under the impact of this simply overwhelming documenta­
tion, Spencer felt compelled to complement the Maimonidean concept of nor­
mative inversion with its opposite which he termed 'translate and 'mutatio\ 
translation and borrowing. The second of his three books is devoted to inver­
sion, the third to translation. 
This juxtaposition of two contradictory principles makes up the heteroge­
neous nature or 'inbetweenness' of Spencer's text. The 'inversion' part repre­
sents his Maimonides side, the 'translation' part his Reinhold side. Both, how­
ever, belong to his particular and very complex form of paganology. Spencer 
is in fact as far removed from the orthodox view of pagan religion which sees 
in it just a devilish imitation of Biblical religion", as from the Renaissance 
idea of prisca theologia, which did not recognize any difference between 
Biblical and pagan religion, tradition, wisdom or 'theology' but knew of only 
One Great and common tradition of truth that had been transmitted by the 
ancient sages such as Hermes Trismegistus, Zoroaster, Zalmoxis, Orpheus, 
Pythagoras and Plato.12 
Prisca theologia was the prevailing paradigm during the Renaissance and 
was connected with names such as Gemisthos Plethon, Marsilio Ficino, Gio­
vanni Pico della Mirandola, Agostino Steuco, Francesco Patrizi. With the 17lh 
century, a new intellectual climate set in, based on a strict distinction between 
Christian and Pagan thought, in fact a complete restoration of what I proposed 
to call the 'Mosaic Distinction' between true and false religion. Now, Zoro­
aster and Hermes Trismegist appeared no longer as variants of one universal 
truth, but as the other, as representatives of pagan, oriental religions. Strangely 
enough, however, this excommunication of the oriental religions actually 
served to intensify the scholarly interest in them. This is the origin of early 
modern 'paganology', the study of pagan religions as pagan, foreign, different. 
This is the paradigm within which Spencer was working. When he speaks of 
translatio, he is thinking of crossing a border, bridging a gap. Translating 
Egyptian into Hebrew no longer means just a slight shift between variants 
within the same body of knowledge; it constitutes a transaction from one 
whole world to another. Egypt, for Spencer, is the other religion, the paragon 
of paganism and idolatry. Spencer characterizes Egyptian religion as the worst 
form of idolatry, indulging in medical metaphors such as 'faeces superstitionis 
' ' For Ihis orthodox view, he refers to Pierre Daniel Huet, Demonstrate Evangelica (Paris, 
1679). 
'2 See Michael Stausberg, Faszination Zarathustra. Zoroaster und die Europaische Religionsge-
schichte der Friihen Neuzeit (Berlin and New York: W. de Gruyter, 1998; religionsgeschicht-
lichc Versuche und Vorarbciten 42), cf. also Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Philosophia l\>-
rennis. Hislorische Umrisse abendldndischer Spiritualitdt in Antike. Miltelalter und Fruher 
Neuzeit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998). 
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Aegyptiacae', 'idolomaniae pestis\ 'impietatis Aegyptiacae lues', 'pestis Ae-
gyptiaca' etc. and is careful to draw the distinction between idolatry and mono­
theism as emphatically as possible. The worlds of Egyptian idolatry and Hebrew 
monotheism, between which Moses was acting as a go­between, were thus 
strongly opposed to each other in Spencer's imagination. It is hardly conceiv­
able how he himself could reconcile within his scholarly mind these two an­
tagonistic images of Egypt: as the opposite of Biblical monotheism and at the 
same time as the origin and model of Biblical Law. 
Spencer resolved this contradiction through his concept of double religion, 
distinguishing between exoteric and esoteric religion as well as between primary 
and secondary meanings of the ritual laws: the primary meaning functioned in 
its 'inversion' nature as a therapy against idolatry, the secondary meaning, by 
contrast, in its 'translation' nature as an adumbration of some higher truth, func­
tioning in the same way as the Egyptian hieroglyphs. In practising this double­
semiotics, Spencer was following the model of Maimonides. According to 
Spencer, Maimonides distinguished between the literal and the mystical sense of 
the law, which he called 'verba duplicata' or D^DS n m (divrej kfilayim: 'words 
of reduplication').' This distinction functions as a leading principle in 
Spencer's work, where it appears as rationes primariae vs. secundariae. Mai­
monides introduced the distinction in order to explain the hidden historical rea­
son for the ritual laws. Their function as a mncmotechnique of forgetting by 
superinscription of Zabian rites was, of course, concealed from the people ­
otherwise they would have had no reason to keep the laws once the Zabian re­
ligion had disappeared from history. Their mystical meaning upon which the 
timeless validity of the law is founded was accessible only to those sages who 
knew that the true God needs neither sacrifices nor ritual adoration. Maimonides 
therefore interpreted Judaism as a double or mystery religion, divided into an 
exoteric and an esoteric side, a view which Spencer fully accepted. The Zabian 
religion, however, was denied this duplicity. There was no mystery, no esotcri­
cism in Zabian religion. The Zabians practised their sacrificial rites in their 
literal meaning, in order to serve, to feed and to worship their gods; they had no 
deeper understanding, no knowledge of any esoteric significance to their rites. 
For Maimonides, the double­faced structure of mystery religion was the exclu­
sive and distinctive feature of Judaism, a feature which put it on a plane above 
paganism. This is the main point where Spencer deviated from Maimonides. For 
Spencer, pagan, i.e. Egyptian religion was not only a mystery religion in the 
same way as Judaism and Christianity, it was the model for Biblical religion. 
13 Spencer, De legibus, 1, 155. Dr. Evgen Taranlul refers me to Jcs 40,2 for ihc rare form kfilay'^ 
'reduplication', 'double' ('for she hath received of the LORD'S hand double for all her sins') 
Spencer's Hebrew is not punctuated. The adjective kfulim, 'double' corresponding to 'duplies'3 1 
requires, of course, dvarim instead of the status constnictus divrej. 
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Ritual and Theology: Spencer and Cudworth 
Spencer had some ideas about the literal and the mystical meaning of the ritual 
laws of the Hebrews, but he never ventures an opinion on the mystical mean­
ing of the Egyptian rites. The Reinhold side of his argumentation and the con­
tradiction in his argument therefore remain latent. Had he cared for the higher 
meaning of Egyptian rites, symbols and hieroglyphs, he would have been 
compelled to accept the ideas of the prisca theologia tradition and to admit 
that the interior side of the Egyptian mysteries consisted in the same truth 
which Moses brought to the Hebrews. I think that we are dealing here with a 
case of conscious avoidance. During the same years when Spencer was work­
ing on his De Legibus, his colleague at Cambridge, Ralph Cudworth, professor 
regius of Hebrew at the university, finished and published his True Intellectual 
System of the Universe, in which he reconstructed what he called the 'arcane 
theology' of ancient Egypt.'4 Cudworth, an important representative of the 
group of Cambridge platonists, presented in his True Intellectual System a 
modernized version of the Renaissance tradition of Prisca theologia, modern­
ized in that he did full justice to the late dating of the Hermetic texts by Isaac 
Casaubon, who had shown that the Corpus Hermeticum was not composed in 
or before the time of Moses, but in the 3rd century AD.15 It is beyond the 
scope of this contribution to show how Cudworth managed to rescue Hermes 
Trismegistus from Casaubon's accusation of forgery and once again to build a 
natural theology on the foundation of Hermetism; suffice to say that he did so 
with tremendous success. All the sources he collected converged in the idea 
that God was 'One­and­All', Hen kai Pan, thus establishing that the esoteric 
monotheism of the Egyptians consisted in the philosophy of All­Oneness or 
pantheism. Spencer seems to have left to Cudworth the questions of theology, 
of polytheism and monotheism, occupying himself solely with ritual. His 
avoidance of these topics looks like a conscious division of labour. However, 
'4 Ralph Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe: The First Part, wherein All the 
Reason and Philosophy of Atheism is Confuted, and its Impossibility Demonstrated (London, 
1678; repr. Hildesheim: 01ms, 1977). 
•5 De rebus sacris el ecclesiasticis exercitationes XVI. Ad Cardinalis Baronii prolegomena in 
annates (London 1614), 70ff. See Frances A. Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradi­
tion (Chicago and London: Chicago UP, 1964), 398-403. Yates does not deal with Cudworth 
and, therefore, underestimates the significance of the hermetic tradition in the later 17th and 
18th centuries. Cf. Anthony Grafton, Defenders of the Text. The Tradition of Scholarship in an 
Age of Science. 1450­1800 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1991), 145-161. 
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as far as I can see, Spencer never refers to Cudworth's book.'6 Cudworth, in 
turn, left unmentioned the relation between Egyptian and Biblical religion and 
the question of how much Moses knew of Egyptian arcane theology. We 
should bear in mind that paganology and prisca theologia were opposite to 
each other, the one emphasizing, the other deconstructing the difference be­
tween religion and idolatry, monotheism and paganism. Cudworth's ideas 
were incompatible with Spencer's methods; but it was precisely the combina­
tion of the two which, in the eighteenth century, led to the intellectual revolu­
tion which I have illustrated with Reinhold and Schiller but which started, of 
course, much earlier. 
It was above all William Warburton, who, some sixty years after Cudworth 
and Spencer, in his voluminous work on the Divine Legation of Moses, 
brought these two loose ends together, the arcane theology of the Egyptians 
and the monotheism of Moses. Basing himself on classical sources'7, Warbur­
ton explained polytheism or idolatry as the political theology of paganism. The 
argument runs briefly as follows. Any pagan people, in the absence of imme­
diate government by God, needs a politically supportive theology that has to 
fulfil two functions. Its first function was to establish civil morality and obedi­
ence to the laws, which nobody would follow if there was not the strong belief 
in gods punishing transgressors and rewarding the faithful, and which nobody, 
seeing the success of the wicked and the misfortunes of the righteous, would 
take seriously if there was not the belief in the immortality of the soul and 
therefore in reward and punishment in the hereafter. The second function of 
political theology was to reflect on the divine plane the distinctions and differ­
ences that constitute the socio­political world: the boundaries between peo­
ples, cities, states and provinces, and the distinction between classes, clans and 
castes. Any society that aims at social order and political power is therefore 
bound to invent a pantheon of tutelary deities, turning meritorious law­givers, 
culture­founders, heroes, chiefs and kings into gods and assigning them func­
tions in the supervision of the laws and the symbolisation of political and 
social identities. These gods are fiction, but a legitimate fiction, because they 
serve a good purpose. Fiction, in a pagan society, is indispensable, otherwise 
any justice and social order would collapse. Warburton, in his intention to 
defend his concept of pagan religion against the priestly fraud theory (la trahi-
son de clercs, Fontenelle18) comes close to Nietzsche and his conception of 
16 In vol. I, 271, note b, Spencer refers to Cudworth's treatise on the Eucharist, A Discourse 
Concerning the True Notion of the Lord's Supper (London, 1642), quoting its title in Latin. 
17 The classical sources are the famous fragment of Critias, a passage in Cicero's De nature 
deorum, a passage in Livius on Numa Pompilius, and the well known statements of Lucretius 
about religion, all of them belonging to and representing the critique of religion in a typical an­
tique Enlightenment tradition. 
18 See Frank Manuel, The Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods (Cambridge, MA: Harvurd 
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life-supportive illusions. 
For this reason, all pagan religions are mystery religions. They are forced 
to keep secret the fictitious nature of their deities, a truth which, were it 
known, would overturn any political order. But this is not all; Warburton goes 
a step further and reconstructs an esoteric theology which amounts to much 
more than mere disillusionment. This esoteric theology is a theology of Na­
ture. In the footsteps of Spencer and especially Cudworth, Warburton con­
structed the famous 'dual religion' hypothesis in a way that established a sharp 
antagonism between the esoteric and the exoteric side of religion, its natural 
and its political theology. This was his special contribution to the tradition and 
progress of paganology. From Clement of Alexandria, he took the distinction 
between 'lesser' and 'greater mysteries'. The lesser mysteries were still part of 
political theology and essentially a hieroglyphic encasement, designed to ad­
dress the populace at large through symbolic icons, sensual rituals, and sacred 
animals. However, they disclosed their deeper signification only to those who 
proved able to understand their secret meaning, which generally consisted in 
teachings about the immortality of the soul and a future life where virtue 
would be rewarded and vice would be punished. The greater mysteries con­
cern natural theology; they were administered only to the very few among the 
initiates who were chosen for kingship and whose minds and virtues were 
strong enough to withstand the truth. This truth was essentially negative: it 
consisted in abolishing the illusionary imagery of polytheism. According to 
Clement of Alexandria, this last and highest initiation led to a point where 'all 
teaching ends' {ouden de manthanein hypoleipetai). Discursive instruction 
stops and immediate vision takes over. 'The doctrines delivered in the Greater 
Mysteries are concerning the universe. Here all instruction ends. Things are 
seen as they are; and Nature, and the workings of Nature, are to be seen and 
comprehended.'19 In the final stage of initiation, the adept is speechlessly 
confronted with Nature. 
The distinction between the Greater Mysteries and official religion includ­
ing the lesser mysteries corresponds to the distinction between truth and fic­
tion, monotheism and idolatry. The difference between monotheism and pa­
ganism is transferred here into the realm of one single religion. No author 
dealing with the concepts of mystery religion and dual religion has ever gone 
so far. The relationship between political and natural theology has been con­
structed in the form of absolute contradiction and mutual negation. Warburton 
did not dare to draw the obvious conclusions, but his readers and especially 
UP, 1959), 47-53. 
' 9 Clem. Alex., Strom., V.Xl.17,1; William Warburton, The divine legation of Moses demon­
strated on the principles of a religious deist, from the omission of the doctrine of a future stale 
of reward and punishment in the Jewish dispensation (London: John Nicholls, 1738-1741; 2nd 
ed. London, 1778, rcpr. Hildeshcim: Olms, 1980), vol. I, 191. 
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Carl Leonhard Reinhold did. The borderline between truth and fiction was not 
marked by revelation, but by initiation. The truth has always been with the 
Egyptians, sheltered in the veil of the mysteries. All that Moses did after hav­
ing been chosen for the throne of Egypt and initiated into the Greater myster­
ies was to return to his fellow Hebrews and reveal to them what he had learned 
in the mysteries. 
One hundred years after Reinhold and two hundred years after Spencer, the 
same debate about the originality of Hebrew religion arose again, this time in 
connection with Babylonia rather than Egypt. The famous Bible/Babel contro­
versy repeated the verdict that Biblical religion is just a copy of something 
else which, this time, was identified with Babylonian religion. In this context, 
the idea of translation was used as an argument against the Bible, which was 
seen as simply derivative of Babylonian tradition. This was not Spencer's 
problem. On the contrary, the fact that much of Biblical laws and rituals were 
taken from Egypt only heightened their interest and authority. It was God who 
led the children of Israel to Egypt and made them dwell there for a couple of 
centuries in order to teach them the Egyptian ways of double religion and 
verba duplicata. Egypt was a necessary stage in human education (educatio 
generis humani). 
In closing, let me just acknowledge the sense in which Spencer's problem 
is still an open and much debated question. Spencer's problem was the doublc­
facedness of the Bible, its relationship with its historical environment in terms 
of both 'inversion' and 'translation', or both 'antagonistic' and 'syncretistic' 
acculturation. 200 years after Spencer, the burning question was the 'Bi­
ble/Babel­debate', where one party claimed that the Bible was to a large de­
gree derivative of Babylonian sources whereas the other party stressed its 
incomparable uniqueness. Today, Old Testament scholars debate whether their 
discipline is about the history of Israelite religion ­ which would be a history 
of translation and adaptation, the position held by the 'syncretism' party ­ or, 
rather, about the theology of the Old Testament, which would, then, be a the­
ology of distinction, the view of the 'antagonism' party. 
The Bible has indeed these two faces: it bears witness to the archaic and 
syncretistic religion of ancient Israel as well as to the nascent monotheism of 
ancient Judaism. It is this 'in­bctweenness' of the Biblical text itself which is 
impressively highlighted by go­betweens such as John Spencer and so many 
other Biblical scholars of his and later times. 
